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____________________________________________________________________ [ 1:. - [ A Look Into Wiretapping ] [psyops] :. ] [psyops@phault.org] :. ] ____________________________________________________________________ Wiretapping is the traditional term for interception of telephone conversations. This should not be taken too literally. The word is no longer restricted to communications traveling by wire, and contemporary wiretaps are more commonly placed on radio links or inside telephone offices. The meaning has also broadened in that the thing being tapped need no longer be a telephone call in the classic sense; it may be some other form of electronic communication, such as fax or data. Compared with the more precise but more general phrase "communications interception," the word "wiretapping" has two connotations. Much the stronger of these is that a wiretap is aimed at a particular target, in sharp contrast to the "vacuum cleaner" interception widely practiced by national intelligence agencies. The weaker connotation is that it is being done by the police. The history of wiretapping in the United States is in fact two histories intertwined. It is a history of wiretapping per se--that is, a history of the installation and use of wiretaps by police, intelligence agencies, honest citizens, businesses, and criminals. It is also a history of society's legal response to wiretapping by these various groups. The origins of wiretapping lie in two quiet different practices: eaves dropping and letter opening. "Eavesdropping," although once more restricted in meaning, has come to describe any attempt to overhear conversations without the knowledge of the participants. "Letter opening" takes in all acquisition, opening reading, and copying of written messages, also without knowledge of the sending and receiving parties. Telecommunication has unified and systematized these practices. Before the electronic era, a conversation could only be carried on by people located within earshot of each other, typically a few feet apart. Neither advanced planning nor great effort on the part of the participants was required to ensure a high degree of security. Written communications were more vulnerable, but intercepting one was still a hit-or-miss affair. Messages traveled by a variety of postal services, couriers, travelers, and merchants. Politically sensitive messages, in particular, could not be counted on to go by predictable channels, so special couriers were sometimes employed. And written messages enjoyed another sort of protection. Regardless of a spy's skill with flaps and seals, there was no guarantee that, if a letter was intercepted, opened, and read, the victim would not notice the intrusion. Since spying typically has to be done covertly in order to succeed, the chance of detection is a substantial deterrent. Electronic communication has changed all this in three fundamental ways: it has made telecommunication too convenient to avoid; it has, despite appearances, reduced the diversity of channels by which written messages once traveled; and it has made the act of interception invisible to the target. Conversation by telephone has achieved an almost equal footing with face-to-face conversation. It is impossible today to run a successful business without the telephone, and eccentric even to attempt to do without the telephone in private life. The telephone provides a means of communication so effective and convenient that even people who are aware of the danger of being overheard routinely put aside their caution and use it to convey sensitive information. As the number of channels of communication has increased (there are now hundreds of communication companies, with myriad fibers, satellites, and microwave links), the diversity of communication paths has diminished. In the days of oxcart and sail, there was no registry of the thousands of people willing to carry a message in return for a tip from the recipient. Today, telecommunications carriers must be registered with national and local regulatory bodies and are well known to trace associations and industry watch groups. Thus, interception has become more systematic. Spies, no longer faced with a patchwork of ad hoc couriers, know better where to look for what they seek. Perhaps more important, interception of telecommunications leaves no telltale "marks on the envelop." It is inherent in telecommunication-- and inseparable from its virtues--that the sender and the receiver of a message have no way of telling who else may have recorded a copy. Any discussion of wiretapping, particularly a legal discussion, is complicated by the fact that electronics has not only made interception of telecommunications possible; it has also made it easier to "bug" face-to-face conversations. Bugging would be nearly irrelevant to the central subject of this document--Taking A Deeper Trip Into Wiretapping--were it not for the fact that bugs and wiretaps are inseparably intertwined in law and jurisprudence and named by one collective term: electronic surveillance. Wiretaps and bugs are powerful investigative tools. They allow the eavesdropper to overhear conversations between politicians, criminals, lawyers, or lovers without the targets' knowing that their words are being share with unwanted listeners. Electronic surveillance is a tool that can detect criminal conspiracies and provide prosecutors with strong evidence--the conspirators' incriminating statements in their own voices--all without danger to law-enforcement officers. On the other hand, the very invisibility on which electronic surveillance depends for its effectiveness makes it evasive of oversight and readily adaptable to malign uses. Electronic surveillance can be and has been used by those in power to undermine the democratic process by spying on their political opponents. In light of this, it is not surprising that Congress and the courts have approached wiretapping and bugging with suspicion. Today, communication enjoys a measure of protection under US law, and neither government agents nor private citizens are permitted to wiretap at will. This has not always been the case. The current view that wiretaps are a kind of search--has evolved by fits and starts over a century and a half. The Supreme Court ruled in 1967 that the police may not employ wiretaps without court authorization. Congress has embraced this principle, limiting police use of wiretaps and setting standards for the granting of warrants. The same laws prohibit most wiretapping by private citizens. The rules against unwarranted wiretapping are not absolute, however. For example, the courts ruled in 1992 (United States vs. David Lee Smith, 978 F. 2nd 171, US App) that conversations over cordless phones were not protected and that police tapping of cordless phones did not require a search warrant. A 1994 statute (Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Public Law 103-414, §202) extended the warrant requirements of the earlier law to cover cordless phones. The law also makes some exceptions for businesses intercepting the communications of their own employees on company property. Feedback would be nice [psyops@phault.org]. b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@! b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@! b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@! b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@! b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!b0g!#@!